| dc.description.abstract | Cartel activity occurs due to the emergence of business competition in an industrial business, which has the potential to result in unfair business competition. Cartels are difficult to detect because they can take the form of written or unwritten agreements. In practice, KPPU faces obstacles in disclosing cartels, considering that cartel deals are usually carried out secretly. Cartel evidence uses direct evidence and indirect evidence. KPPU introduced the concept of behavior change so that more cartel actions could be exposed by issuing Perkom No. 1 of 2019. But this is not enough to help KPPU. Countries such as the United States and Singapore implement leniency programs as an effort to prove cartel. However, business competition law in Indonesia does not regulate leniency programs. The problems discussed in this thesis are related to cartel arrangements in business competition law, how leniency programs are regulated in Indonesia, and comparisons of leniency programs in Singapore and the United States. The author uses normative juridical law research methods, comparative approaches, and library research data collection techniques. The results of the study concluded that it was difficult for the KPPU to dismantle cartels because it only used direct and indirect evidence, as well as the rule of reason approach and the concept of behavior change. The leniency program is a proven solution for dismantling cartels. The effectiveness of implementing the leniency program has prompted Singapore and the United States to regulate these provisions for business competition law enforcement agencies in order to create a fair business competition climate. Regulatory design and technical implementation of the leniency program in the two countries can be taken into consideration in making a leniency program in Indonesia, by applying the concept of the leniency program in the United States and adding the fast-track procedure that Singapore has. | en_US |
